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Neither Strict Nor Nuanced: The 
Balanced Standard For False Claims Act 
Pleading In The Eleventh Circuit 
C. CAITLIN GILES* 
   False Claims Act litigation is more hotly contested than 
ever before. One such controversial issue plaguing federal 
courts is the proper application of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) to actions arising under the False Claims 
Act. The explosion of litigation under the FCA caused a 
circuit split to emerge on the correct standard to use when 
applying Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement for 
more particularity. Specifically, courts are split on the level 
of specificity required to prove that a false claim was sub-
mitted to the government. Some apply a “strict” interpreta-
tion and require pleadings to include representative sam-
ples of the actual false claims that were submitted to the 
government, while others utilize a more “nuanced” stand-
ard and simply demand that complaints include details of a 
fraudulent scheme paired with reliable indicia to support 
an inference that claims were submitted. The effect of this 
uncertainty among the federal circuits means the difference 
between the dismissal of an action before reaching discov-
ery or the continuation to a potentially multi-million-dollar 
judgment. As this circuit split implicates vast financial con-
sequences, the Rule 9(b) question in FCA actions is of the 
utmost importance.  
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. 2016, University of Miami School of Law 
2016] NIETHER STRICT NOR NUANCED 1213 
 
   This article focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit inter-
prets the requirements of Rule 9(b), in order to contribute 
to the widespread commentary on how the circuit split may 
be resolved. Ultimately, if the Supreme Court does decide 
to grant cert on this issue, this Comment urges that the 
Eleventh Circuit should serve as a model for the properly 
balanced application of Rule 9(b) for actions arising under 
the False Claims Act. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (“FCA” or “Act”) is the United States 
Government’s foremost anti-fraud recovery tool, which subjects an-
yone who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to civil penalties, in ad-
dition to three times the amount of damages the Government suf-
fered as a result of such action.1 The Act authorizes private citizens 
to file a civil action, also known as a qui tam action, on behalf of the 
United States and recover a percentage of the proceeds.2 Depending 
on various factors, such as whether or not the Government inter-
venes and the plaintiff’s overall contribution to the case, a successful 
                                                                                                             
 1 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1) (West 2012). 
 2 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)–(d). 
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qui tam plaintiff may be awarded anywhere between ten to thirty 
percent of the recovery.3 
So, why care about this? The biannual Gibson Dunn False 
Claims Update provides some perspective: “On November 16, 2015, 
a for-profit education company agreed to pay $95.5 million to settle 
claims that the company falsely certified that it was compliant with 
Title IV . . . The relators will split $11.3 million.”4 The employees 
who blew the whistle on that company are now multi-millionaires. 
With help from the whistleblowers, the government was able to re-
cover three times the amount that it had originally lost. This is just 
one company in just one industry.5 In other cases, the recovery is 
even more incredible. For example, on “December 8, 2014, two for-
eign companies settled alleged civil violations relating to services 
provided to U.S. troops in Afghanistan  . . . The companies agreed 
to pay $288.35 million in the criminal matter and an additional $146 
million to resolve the civil cases  . . . The qui tam whistleblower 
who filed the initial FCA lawsuit will receive $16.16 million.”6 As 
observed by Gibson Dunn, “[t]here is no end in sight to the False 
Claims Act gold rush.”7 
Year after year, the list of FCA recoveries continues to grow. In 
2014 alone, the government recovered a record-setting $5.7 billion 
dollars from settlements and judgments under the False Claims Act.8  
Although 2015 could be considered a down year, the government 
still collected an impressive sum of $3.6 billion dollars.9 Over the 
past 5 years, the government used the False Claims Act to recover 
more than $21 billion dollars.10 Qui tam actions have proven to be 
                                                                                                             
 3 31 U.S.C § 3730(d). 
 4 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, 2015 Year-End False Claims Act Update, 
GIBSONDUNN (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/docu-
ments/2015-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.pdf. 
 5 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, 2014 Year-End False Claims Act Update, 
GIBSONDUNN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Docu-
ments/ 2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.pdf. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, 2015 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, 
GIBSONDUNN (July 8, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publica-
tions/pages/2015-Mid-Year-False-Claims-Act-Update.aspx. 
 8 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 5. 
 9 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 4. 
 10 Id. 
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critical for the government’s success; in fact, qui tam relators insti-
gated “about 67% of all FCA recoveries since 1986.”11  Gibson 
Dunn reports, “Since 1986, whistleblower qui tam cases have led to 
$29.2 billion in government recoveries.”12 Qui tam plaintiffs filed 
713 FCA lawsuits in 2014 and earned $435 million as a result.13 As 
evidenced by the exponential growth of FCA recoveries, both the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and whistleblower counsels are ded-
icating more time and resources to bringing FCA claims.14 
This growth means that False Claims Act litigation is more hotly 
contested than ever before.15 One such controversial issue plaguing 
federal courts is the proper application of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 9(b) to actions arising under the False Claims Act.16 One ef-
fect of the explosion of litigation under the FCA is the emergence of 
a circuit split on the correct standard to use when applying Rule 
9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement for more particularity.17 
Specifically, courts are split on the level of specificity required to 
adequately plead that a false claim was submitted to the govern-
ment.18  Some apply a strict interpretation and require pleadings to 
include “representative samples” of the actual false claims that were 
submitted to the government, while others utilize a more nuanced 
standard and simply demand that complaints include details of a 
                                                                                                             
 11 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 5. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Recovers 
Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, JUSTICE.GOV 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014. 
 15 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 4. 
 
 16 Id. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “in all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition 
of mind of a person may be averred generally.” 
 17 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, 2014 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, 
GIBSONDUNN (July 9, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publica-
tions/Pages/2014-Mid-Year-False-Claims-Act-Update.aspx; Foglia v. Renal 
Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 18 See Foglia, 754 F.3d at 155–56. 
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fraudulent scheme “paired with reliable indicia” to support an infer-
ence that claims were submitted.19 The effect of this uncertainty 
among the circuits could mean the difference between the dismissal 
of an action before reaching discovery or the continuation towards 
a potentially multi-million-dollar judgment. As this circuit split im-
plicates vast financial consequences, the Rule 9(b) question in FCA 
actions is of the utmost importance.20 
This Comment analyzes how the Eleventh Circuit interprets the 
requirements of Rule 9(b), in order to contribute to the widespread 
commentary on how the circuit split may be resolved.21 Part II de-
tails a history of the False Claims Act and current application of 
Rule 9(b). Part III describes the circuit split and ensuing contro-
versy. Part IV outlines the evolution of the Eleventh Circuit’s Rule 
9(b) standard, and argues where the Eleventh Circuit falls on the 
strict versus nuanced spectrum. Finally, Part V explores whether or 
not the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve this issue. 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. 
 20 See Robert J. Conlan, Jr., Third Circuit Adopts More Lenient Application 
Of Rule 9(b) In FCA Cases, ORIGINAL SOURCE: THE SIDLEY AUSTIN FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=05b8d4a7-6d87-458b-9ffb-b5cb9e4f812a (“The chasm between the 
two camps of Circuits on the Rule 9(b) issue has been sharply delineated for some 
time. The Third Circuit’s opinion in Foglia further highlights the need for the 
Supreme Court finally to resolve the dispute and set forth clear guidance as to 
how Rule 9(b) applies to FCA claims.”) 
 
 21 See generally Emily T. Chen, Depressing Diagnosis: Stringent Particular-
ity Requirement of the Rule 9(b) Pleading Standard As A Critical Bar to Off-Label 
Promotion Fraud Whistleblowers, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 333 (2014); Aaron Ru-
bin, To Present Bills or Not to Present? An In-Depth Analysis of the Burden of 
Pleading in Qui Tam Suits, 8 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 467 (2012); Charis Ann 
Mitchell, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 337 (2010); Mark R. Troy, The 
Early Round Knockout Punch to A Qui Tam Action: Recent Decisions Upholding 
Rule 9(b) Challenges to Relators’ Speculative Allegations, 41 PROCUREMENT 
LAW. 1 (Winter 2006); Patrick Venter, Whistleblower’s Delight: An Evaluation 
of the Third Circuit Decision in Foglia v. Renal Ventures, 56 B.C.L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 195 (2015); and Vann Bentley, Getting Particular: Finding the Ap-
propriate False Claims Act Pleading Standard Post-Nathan v. Takeda Pharma-
ceuticals, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (2015). 
 
 
 
2016] NIETHER STRICT NOR NUANCED 1217 
 
Ultimately, if the Supreme Court does decide to grant certiorari on 
this issue, this Comment urges that the Eleventh Circuit should serve 
as a model for the properly balanced application of Rule 9(b) for 
actions arising under the False Claims Act. 
II.  BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND 
RULE 9(B) 
A.   The False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act makes it illegal for individuals to present 
fraudulent claims for payment to the government.22 The origins of 
the False Claims Act reflect how fraud has persistently plagued the 
U.S. government since its founding years.23 The first impetus for the 
Act was the Civil War, when fraud by government contractors dras-
tically increased as the demand for war supplies became more ur-
gent.24 An 1864 copy of Harper’s Monthly Magazine illustrated how 
the Union Army would blindly accept and pay any price for com-
modities offered, regardless of the item’s quality or whether the item 
was what they had actually requested.25 For example, when the gov-
ernment purchased sugar, bags of sand arrived and when they 
bought horses, they received donkeys instead.26 
At the request of President Lincoln, Congress enacted the pre-
cursor to the FCA in 1863 to combat this kind of fraud from Union 
Army suppliers.27  The precursor legislation imposed both criminal 
penalties and civil liability for presenting a false claim against the 
government.28 Individuals were fined two thousand dollars for every 
                                                                                                             
 22 31 USC § 3729–3732 (2012). 
 23 See CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENT 33–34 (2d ed. 2010). 
 
 24 Id. at 42–43 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 43 (quoting Robert Tomes, Fortunes of War, 29 HARPER’S MONTHLY 
MAG. 228 (1864)). 
 27 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863); H.R. REP. NO. 
111-97, at 2–3 (2009). 
 28 H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, pt. 2, at 17 (1986). Despite originating in the context 
of fraud from government contractors, the False Claims Act was meant to address 
fraud in all industries. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (“Fraud permeates 
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violation, as well as double the cost of damages suffered by the gov-
ernment as a result of that violation.29 Importantly, the Act author-
ized qui tam suits, whereby private citizens were “deputized” to pur-
sue civil actions on behalf of the United States.30 The driving moti-
vation behind enacting the qui tam provision was the rationale that 
private citizens could help expose fraud in ways that the government 
could not.31 Thus, Congress drafted the Act’s qui tam provisions in 
order to incentivize private citizens to expose schemes to defraud 
the government and ultimately participate in the resulting lawsuit as 
an interested party.32 The citizen bringing the suit, now known as 
the “relator,” would bring the action in the name of the United States 
and participate in the ensuing litigation until reaching a settlement 
or final judgment.33 One important motivation under the original Act 
was that a successful relator received half of the reward, thus recog-
nizing that these individuals could identify fraud more efficiently 
than the government and should be rewarded for it.34 
Congress amended the Act several times since its original con-
ception, usually as a response to economic and social policies re-
quiring more or less support for a private law enforcement regime.35 
                                                                                                             
generally all Government programs ranging from welfare and food stamps bene-
fits, to multibillion dollar defense procurements, to crop subsidies and disaster 
relief programs.”). However, not all fraud is implicated under the False Claims 
Act. Specifically, liability under the False Claims Act attaches, “not to the under-
lying fraudulent activity . . . but to the ‘claim for payment.’” United States v. Ri-
vera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 29 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 44. 
 30 Id. at 45; H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 16. Qui tam is shorthand for “qui tam 
pro domingo rege quam pro se imposo sequitu,” a Latin phrase meaning “who 
brings the action as well for the king as for himself.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1237 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing United States ex rel. Kelly 
v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 746 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140, 
114 S.Ct. 1125, 127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994). 
 
 31 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 35; See U.S. ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 
F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The central purpose of the qui tam provision 
in ‘Lincoln’s Law’ then, as is now, was to encourage private individuals aware of 
fraudulent schemes perpetrated against the government to bring such information 
forward and thereby aid in the effort to root out fraud.”) 
 32 H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 2–3 (2009). 
 33 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 45. 
 34 Id. at 45. 
 35 See Williams, 931 F.2d at 1497. 
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Congress first amended the Act in 1943 in response to concerns that 
the Act was being misused through “parasitical suits,” or lawsuits 
where the relator brought an action based on information copied 
from government files.36 To address this, the amendment required 
that qui tam relators base their allegations on independently ob-
tained information, removing jurisdiction for claims based on any 
information already in the government’s possession.37  The amend-
ments also granted the government the power to take complete con-
trol over a relator’s claim, resulting in removal of the relator from 
any further role in the litigation.38 Finally, the 1943 amendments re-
duced the relator’s percent of the recovery.39 If the government in-
tervened, relators were only entitled to ten percent or less, and if the 
government did not intervene, they were awarded a maximum of 
twenty-five percent or less of the proceed, a stark contrast to the 
1863 statute’s fifty percent allowance.40 Although these changes 
prevented citizens from abusing the Act through “parasitical suits,” 
the practical effect was much broader.41 Not only did qui tam actions 
become less viable in general, but also the incentives for whistle-
blowers disappeared, making the risk of whistleblowing not worth 
the cost.42 Ultimately, the 1943 amendments rendered the False 
Claims Act effectively useless.43 
Forty years later, Congress shifted its focus.44 Noting that the 
Act was not being utilized to its full capacity due to restrictive court 
interpretations, and in response to concerns about the rampant 
growth of fraud against the government in the 1980s, Congress de-
cided to modernize it through the False Claims Amendments Act of 
                                                                                                             
 36 Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C.A. §§ 232–235 (1976); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 48. 
 37 Williams, 931 F.2d at 1497. 
 38 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 51–52. 
 39 Id. at 52. 
 40 Id. at 52. 
 41 Williams, 931 F.2d at 1497; Sylvia, supra note 20, at 53. 
 42 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 54. 
 43 Id. at 53; Williams, 931 F.2d at 1497 (“After 1943 . . . government employ-
ees were effectively prohibited from bringing suit under the False Claims Act.”) 
 44 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 57. 
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1986.45 These changes first promoted the growth of FCA litigation 
and still persist in the Act today.46 The amendments include a pro-
vision whereby qui tam actions are filed under seal for sixty days 
and served on the Government, but not the defendant, to provide the 
Government time to decide whether or not it wants to intervene.47 If 
the Government decides to intervene, the qui tam relator may con-
tinue to participate in the case, subject to a few constraints meant to 
protect the Government and the defendant.48 Additionally, with 
“good cause,” the government now has the option to intervene in a 
case that it initially declined to join.49  Congress again recognized 
that cooperation with private individuals with firsthand knowledge 
of fraudulent activity was necessary for the Act to be most effective 
and sought to remove the “conspiracy of silence,” which previously 
existed under the Act.50 Congress recognized that “detecting fraud 
is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who 
are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent 
activity,” especially given the huge difference in resources that large 
corporations under investigation for fraud have at their disposal 
compared to that of the government.51  Thus, the drafters designed 
the amendments to once again incentivize private citizens to help 
bolster the “government’s fraud enforcement effort”—the same ra-
tionale of the original 1863 enactment.52 
Currently, when the government intervenes, a successful relator 
is authorized to receive a minimum of fifteen percent and a maxi-
                                                                                                             
 45 Id.; False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 
3153 (1986), codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–3733 (1994). 
 46 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729–3732 (2012); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 62. 
 
 47 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 57; 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2)–(3). 
 48 Examples include dismissing or settling the action notwithstanding objec-
tions of the relator and removing a relator from participation in the case, if doing 
so will interfere with the Government’s prosecution. Sylvia, supra note 20, at 57; 
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(1)–(2). 
 49 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(3). 
 50 In essence, an employee’s unfair choice between keeping his or her job or 
keeping quiet about an employer’s fraudulent schemes. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5 
(1986). 
 51 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4, 8 (1986). 
 52 Id. at 8. 
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mum of twenty-five percent of the recovery, depending on the rela-
tor’s involvement.53 In contrast, a qui tam plaintiff who succeeds 
without government intervention is entitled to twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the proceeds.54  Additionally, a relator must be the origi-
nal source of information or else he/she may only receive a maxi-
mum of ten percent.55 Recognizing that many qui tam plaintiffs are 
employees who come forward to report the fraudulent activities of 
their own employers, Congress also sought to protect these whistle-
blowers.56 Thus, the amendments included an anti-retaliation provi-
sion for qui tam relators, which created a right of action for any em-
ployee retaliated against due to his or her involvement in a proceed-
ing under the False Claims Act.57 
Despite these changes, intended to persuade more whistleblow-
ers to come forward with allegations of fraud, Congress still sought 
to prevent parasitic or frivolous lawsuits.58 They imposed an origi-
nal source rule, which says that if the government is aware of infor-
mation forming the basis for a claim, the relator may only bring a 
qui tam lawsuit if he or she was the original source of that infor-
mation.59 Additionally, the Act awards attorney’s fees to defendants 
who prevail in suits that were clearly frivolous or brought for the 
purpose of harassment.60 
Since 1986, Congress has continued to amend the False Claims 
Act when needed to provide clarity and further its intentions. In 
2009, under the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (“FERA”), 
Congress made claims easier to bring under the FCA by expanding 
liability and funding anti-fraud enforcement.61 In 2010, Congress 
                                                                                                             
 53 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(1). 
 54 Id. at § 3730(d)(2); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59. 
 55 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59 
 56 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5 (1986); Sylvia, supra note 
20, at 59. 
 
 57 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59. 
 58 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59. 
 59 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A); Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59. 
 60 Sylvia, supra note 20, at 59; 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4). 
 61 The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 
123 Stat. 1617 (2009). For an explanation of these changes, see Jones Day, Fraud 
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 Becomes Law, Expanding Exposure Under the 
False Claims Act and Funding Anti-Fraud Enforcement, JONES DAY 
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further clarified its intent by amending the False Claims Act through 
both the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.62 These 
changes increased anti-retaliation protection, defined key terms, and 
further expanded liability under the FCA.63 
Ultimately, this legislative history shows how Congress in-
tended the False Claim Act to encourage qui tam lawsuits and 
thereby help the government recover billions of dollars.64 To that 
end, the Act has been extremely successful; in the 2014 fiscal year 
alone, the DOJ reported that it obtained a record-breaking $5.7 bil-
lion dollars in settlements and judgments in favor of the govern-
ment, with $3 billion filed under the qui tam provisions.65 As indi-
cated in Table 1 below, actions brought by qui tam plaintiffs play an 
increasingly important role in FCA suits, in contrast to government-
initiated lawsuits. 
                                                                                                             
COMMENTARY (June 2009), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publica-
tion/ba69538b-ed12-4412-a08d-e4ed5aaca676/Presentation/PublicationAttach-
ment/0d373005-e71d-4f4c-a59d-bc0ab830c07e/Fraud%20Enforcement.pdf. 
 62 CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE 
GOVERNMENT 4 (2d ed. Supp. 2014); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1079A(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2079 
(2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 63 See generally, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 6402(f)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1079A(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 
2079 (2010). 
 64 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8. 
 65 Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 14. 
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Table 1, “Number of FCA New Matters, Including Qui Tam Ac-
tions”66 
Qui tam relators filed more lawsuits in 2013 than any year 
prior,67 and the Justice Department reported that in 2014, that num-
ber exceeded 700 for the second year in a row.68 Whistleblowers 
received nearly $435 million dollars out of FCA recoveries that to-
taled almost $3 billion dollars.69 This trend continued in 2015, where 
qui tam plaintiffs initiated 86% of the FCA cases filed, and recov-
ered a record-breaking $1.1 billion dollars from cases where the 
government declined to intervene.70 Clearly, the congressional pur-
pose motivating the False Claims Act is being met and, as a result, 
                                                                                                             
 66 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 4. 
 67 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 17. 
 68 Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 14. 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 4. 
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fraud enforcement under the False Claims Act is recognized as a 
crucial component of the DOJ’s work.71 As former Acting Assistant 
Attorney General Joyce Branda commented, ”We acknowledge the 
men and women who have come forward to blow the whistle on 
those who would commit fraud on our government pro-
grams. . . . [i]n strengthening and protecting the False Claims Act, 
Congress has given us the law enforcement tools that are so essential 
to guarding the treasury and deterring others from exploiting and 
misusing taxpayer dollars. We are grateful for their continued sup-
port.”72 
B.   Rules 8 and 9(b) 
In 1938, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de-
cided to de-emphasize the pleading stage by pushing the sorting 
function (in essence, the phase when Courts will scrutinize which 
claims should proceed to trial and which should be dismissed ear-
lier) to the discovery phase, or the next stage of litigation.73 Now, 
the basic requirement to get past the pleading stage is simply to pro-
vide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”74 The drafter’s decision to utilize “notice plead-
ing” meant that plaintiffs with valid claims, but who could only ob-
tain evidence through a discovery process, would be given access to 
justice (even if doing so might impose unwarranted costs on defend-
ants).75 However, the Supreme Court, in the Twombly-Iqbal line of 
cases, imposed a more demanding requirement for complaints to get 
past the pleading stage.76  Now the complaint must include more 
than conclusory statements and, while Rule 8’s pleading standard 
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a pleading that offers 
a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
                                                                                                             
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers -- Strike Rule 
9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 283 (2004); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 385 (8th ed. 2012). 
 74 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
 75 Yeazell, supra note 69, at 388. 
 76 See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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do.”77 In essence, plaintiffs may advance to the discovery phase 
without significant effort, but at the very least, the plaintiffs must 
nudge “their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”78 
While Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement controls 
most proceedings, Rule 9(b) applies in special circumstances: when-
ever a complaint alleges “fraud or mistake.”79 When this occurs, the 
court will apply a heightened pleading standard, whereby “a party 
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake.”80  This particularity requirement must be read in conjunc-
tion with Rule 8, not as a substitute.81 The purposes behind the 
heightened requirement of Rule 9(b) include: firstly, ensuring “that 
the defendant has sufficient information to formulate a defense by 
putting it on notice of the conduct complained of;” secondly, “to 
protect defendants from frivolous suits;” thirdly, “to eliminate fraud 
actions in which all the facts are learned after discovery;” and fi-
nally, to “protect[] defendants from harm to their goodwill and rep-
utation.”82  Notably, the common law elements of fraud need not be 
alleged for Rule 9(b) to apply; the only requirement is that situations 
involve circumstances that constitute fraud.83  The oft-quoted stand-
ard is that Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint establishes the fol-
lowing four criteria: 
(1) precisely what statements were made in what 
documents or oral representations or what omissions 
                                                                                                             
 77 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 78 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 79 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
 80 Id. 
 81 United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“We apply Rule 9(b) to fraud complaints with ‘bite’ and ‘without apology,’ 
but also aware that Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)’s notice 
pleading.”) 
 82 Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 
1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. 
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1055, 1056–57 (S.D. Ga. 
1990)); Fairman, supra note 73, at 290; See also Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 
LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 
Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002); Wood ex rel. U.S. v. Applied Research 
Assoc., Inc., 328 F. App’x 744, 747 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 83 Fairman, supra note 73, at 288; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
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were made, (2) the time and place of each such state-
ment and the person responsible for making (or, in 
the case of omissions, not making) same, (3) the con-
tent of such statements and the manner in which they 
misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants ob-
tained as a consequence of the fraud.84 
Because FCA cases involve allegations of fraud, federal courts 
universally apply Rule 9(b) to cases arising under the False Claims 
Act.85 Thus, complaints alleging violations of the FCA must comply 
with the dictates of both Rule 8 and 9(b).86 To satisfy the particular-
ity requirement of 9(b), relators are required to plead “facts as to 
time, place, and substance of the defendant’s alleged fraud, specifi-
cally the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when 
they occurred, and who engaged in them,”87 or more simply put, the 
                                                                                                             
 84 U.S. ex rel. Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, 
Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 85 Cases from each circuit apply Rule 9(b): See United States ex rel. Schwedt 
v. Planning Research Corp., 59 F.3d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Gold v. Morrison–
Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. ex rel. LaCorte v. 
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs, Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead fraud with particu-
larity, specifying the time, place and substance of the defendant’s alleged con-
duct.”); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783–84 
(4th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 
193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999); Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 
563 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b) ap-
plies to complaints brought under the FCA.”); United States ex rel. Gross v. AIDS 
Research Alliance, 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The FCA is an anti-fraud 
statute and claims under it are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of 
Rule 9(b).”); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 
557 (8th Cir. 2006); Bly–Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 
2001); U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e now make clear that Rule 9(b) does apply to actions under the 
False Claims Act.”). 
 86 U.S. ex rel. Keeler v. Eisai, Inc., 568 F. App’x 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(unpublished) (“In addition to the requirements of Twombly, Iqbal, and Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6), claims asserted under the False Claims 
Act (as well as other fraud claims) are subject to the pleading standards of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).”) 
 87 U.S. ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 671 F.3d 1217, 1222 
(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1324 
(11th Cir. 2009)). 
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“who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud.”88 Although 
some commentators feel this is an improper application of Rule 
9(b),89 the controversy currently plaguing courts is not as much 
whether Rule 9(b) should apply to FCA litigation, but in the actual 
application of 9(b). 
III.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Federal circuits are currently split on the issue of how to apply 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement to actions arising under the 
FCA.90 Specifically, courts disagree over whether to adopt a more 
rigid understanding, where actual false claims must be identified, or 
whether a more nuanced application is preferred, where specific al-
legations that lead to a reasonable inference that false claims were 
submitted will generally suffice.91  The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits seemingly apply Rule 9(b) more rigidly,92 
while the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits tradition-
ally take the more nuanced approach.93 However, it is unclear 
whether circuits with rigid per se requirements consistently uphold 
                                                                                                             
 88 U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2013) 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 53, 190 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2014) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
 89 Not all agree that Rule 9(b) should be applied to False Claims Act litigation 
when such actions do not necessarily involve fraud. See Fairman, supra note 73, 
at 302, n.120. 
 90 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, United States ex rel. 
Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 12-1249), 
denying cert. to 707 F.3d 451 (2013). 
 91 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 17. 
 92 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 
451, 455–56 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1759 (2014); United States 
ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 (6th Cir. 2007); 
United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 
2006); United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield, 472 F.3d 
702, 727–728 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 93 See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 
2009); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 
2010); Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014); United 
States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009); 
United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 
2009).  
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this rule.94 This is especially applicable to the Eleventh Circuit, 
which is often characterized as applying Rule 9(b) more rigidly.95 
Nevertheless, recent Eleventh Circuit decisions seem to be moving 
away from that standard, casting doubt as to whether there was ever 
a strict per se understanding to begin with.96 
As the False Claims Act becomes a more popular tool for com-
batting fraud and reaping its financial rewards, this procedural issue 
likewise grows in importance.97  No plaintiff wants a claim dis-
missed in the pleading stage, but especially not when millions of 
dollars of recovery are at stake.98 Despite this importance, in a 
Fourth Circuit petition for certiorari in United States ex rel. Nathan 
v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., the Supreme Court 
decided not to answer the key question of whether relators must per 
se provide specific identification that false claims were actually sub-
mitted in order to meet the demands of 9(b).99 In the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s brief as Amicus Curiae, the government explained that alt-
hough it recognized the importance of resolving this circuit split and 
favored the more nuanced approach, it felt that circuits might re-
solve this issue on their own and thus, Supreme Court intervention 
was not required.100 So while it is possible that the federal courts of 
                                                                                                             
 94 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 10–11. 
 95 Id.; United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 
2009); Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a plaintiff must 
show representative samples.”) 
 96 U.S. ex rel. Willis v. Angels of Hope Hospice, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-041 
MTT, 2014 WL 684657, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2014) (“Clausen has been read 
to hold that the minimum indicia of reliability required to satisfy Rule 9 are the 
specific contents of actual claims. But not always.”); Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
 97 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 16 
(“The proper application of Rule 9(b) in the FCA context is thus a significant 
issue.”) 
 98 For this very reason, Rule 9(b) is a well-utilized tool for defendants to stop 
an action under the FCA well before they incur the sometimes-staggering cost of 
discovery and trial. One court even commented, “It seems just about every FCA 
complaint draws a Rule 9(b) motion to dismiss.” U.S. ex rel. Willis v. Angels of 
Hope Hospice, Inc., 2014 WL 684657, at *6. 
 99 United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 
455–56 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1759 (2014). 
 100 Additionally, the facts of the Takeda case were not appropriate to decide 
the issue, as it would have failed under either the nuanced or strict approach. How-
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appeals will take a more uniform stance on this issue in the future, 
“there is . . . at least some continuing uncertainty.”101 
While some uncertainty still exists, there is no longer a clear di-
chotomy between “strict” or “nuanced” interpretations of Rule 9(b). 
Although the circuits articulate different standards and cite different 
cases (oftentimes noting that they are in disagreement with their sis-
ter circuits), they are essentially applying the same reasoning to fer-
ret out frivolous claims; any inconsistencies arise from the fact-de-
pendent nature of the “case-by-case” approach taken in most FCA 
cases.102  Ultimately, the driving force behind whether or not a rela-
tor will succeed is how a court balances the purpose of the False 
Claims Act—Congress’s intent to protect the government from 
fraud by encouraging more actions under the FCA103—with that of 
Rule 9(b)—to prevent harassment and fishing expeditions by oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs alleging fraud, a cause especially relevant given 
the vast amount of claims filed per year.104  Thus, this Comment 
                                                                                                             
ever, if a more appropriate, outcome-determinative case arose, the Solicitor Gen-
eral felt that the Supreme Court should then grant certiorari to officially announce 
a uniform standard for Rule 9(b) in the FCA context. Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 14. 
 101 Id. 
 102 For example, the Eleventh Circuit analyzes every motion to dismiss for 
failure to sufficiently plead Rule 9(b) on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., U.S. ex 
rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2012 WL 2871264 at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 
12, 2012) (“The analysis of whether there are sufficient indications of reliability 
that actual claims were submitted is performed on a case by case basis.”) 
 103 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 15 (“A rigid 
rule . . . would hinder the ability of qui tam relators to perform the role that Con-
gress intended them to play in the detection and remediation of fraud against the 
United States.”) 
 104 Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, note 14; see also U.S. ex rel. Pogue 
v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268–70 (D.D.C. 
2002) (“A further purpose . . . is to discourage nuisance suits and frivolous accu-
sations; the . . . court tacitly acknowledged that it was applying 9(b) with severe 
stringency to effectuate these policies.”). 
The First Circuit recently expressed this sentiment: “Although [the FCA’s] finan-
cial incentive encourages would-be relators to expose fraud, it also attracts ‘para-
sitic’ relators who bring FCA damages claims based on information within the 
public domain or that the relator did not otherwise discover. For those reasons, 
there are a number of limitations on qui tam actions, including the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b).” U.S. ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 
123 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 53 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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proposes that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard is not a rigid applica-
tion, but one structured to balance those competing needs most 
fairly.  It should no longer be equated with the disfavored rigid un-
derstanding,105 and instead applauded as the correct interpretation of 
Rule 9(b) in the context of the False Claims Act. To substantiate this 
claim, this Comment will first explore an important question: what 
exactly is going on in the Eleventh Circuit? 
IV.   INTERPRETING THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
A.   Clausen: Setting the Standard 
In the Eleventh Circuit, United States ex rel. Clausen v. Labor-
atory Corporation of America, Inc. (“Clausen”) is the landmark case 
setting the pleading standard precedent for actions under the False 
Claims Act.106 The relator, Clausen, was an employee for a rival 
company of the defendant, Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc. 
(“LabCorp”), a national provider of medical testing services.107 
Clausen alleged that for almost twenty years, LabCorp violated the 
FCA by performing “unauthorized, unnecessary or excessive medi-
cal tests on [] residents who participated in Government-funded 
health insurance programs,” as well as overbilling for improper test-
ing services.108 Clausen argued that LabCorp was defrauding the 
government by violating health insurance reimbursement laws be-
cause “providers are generally entitled to be paid for medical testing 
only when such testing is (1) medically necessary and/or (2) done at 
the direction of a patient’s physician” and the tests LabCorp con-
ducted were not.109 
Clausen amended his complaint after initially filing, providing 
documentary exhibits that listed what medical services were per-
formed on specific patients at specific locations.110 Additionally, 
Clausen offered support for his claims by explaining that his 
                                                                                                             
 105 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 14. 
 106 United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 
1310 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 107 Id. at 1302. 
 108 Id. at 1303. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1304. 
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knowledge of the company’s policies arose from conversations with 
two LapCorp employees.111 He described what technical codes 
would have been used on a specific form submitted to Medicare and 
provided testing histories of three patients at two named locations.112 
Because he provided specific dates and locations of when alleged 
improper testing occurred, Clausen concluded that these tests re-
sulted in the submission of false claims.113 However, the court dis-
missed Clausen’s first amended complaint because he failed to plead 
with the requisite particularity that LabCorp actually submitted false 
claims to the government.114 
Clausen submitted a revised twenty-eight-page second amended 
complaint to address the court’s concerns.115 He provided a blank 
Health Care Financing Administration Form 1500 and a table of 
medical test codes.116 He added to his general allegation that Lab-
Corp’s scheme resulted in false claims submissions by further elab-
orating on how the false claims were submitted via an electronic da-
tabase on the date of service or within a few days after service.117  
Despite this, the court still found that he failed to provide a copy of 
a bill or a completed form, allege any actual dates, and could not 
describe or even offer second-hand information about the billing 
policies.118 Ultimately, “Clausen did not add any billing information 
to support his allegation that actual false claims were submitted for 
payment . . . .Instead he attached one blank claim form and alleged 
that certain tests would have been billed on this form with certain 
test and diagnostic codes filled in.”119 When analyzing FCA cases, 
closely scrutinizing all of the facts is crucial because every detail 
                                                                                                             
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1305. 
 114 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1306 (“While adding certain detail, the First 
Amended Complaint did not include any further allegations about what other un-
named [Long Term Care Facilities] might have been involved in this arrangement, 
the specific dates or amounts of any claims submitted to the Government, or cop-
ies or detailed sources of information about the claims themselves.”) 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1306. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
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matters when applying Rule 9(b); a slight change in exactly what the 
relator pleads could result in a different outcome. 
The court held that Clausen’s complaint failed to meet the 
heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).120 Although Clausen 
twice amended the complaint with much more detail each time, he 
still failed to provide specific information about an actual claim be-
ing submitted to the government, and as Judge Hull phrased it, “the 
submission of a claim is . . . the sine qua non of a False Claims Act 
violation.” 121 In Clausen, the Eleventh Circuit pointedly announced 
that it would not make assumptions; simply pleading the details of a 
scheme to defraud the government, no matter how specific, would 
not be enough to meet the demands of Rule 9(b).122  The relator must 
also provide a reason for the court to infer that illegal claims for 
payment were actually submitted to the government.123 Specifically, 
the court required that “if Rule 9(b) is to be adhered to, some indicia 
of reliability must be given in the complaint to support the allegation 
of an actual false claim for payment being made to the Govern-
ment.”124 Ultimately, the court analyzed each detail presented by 
Clausen and could not find anything providing an “indicia of relia-
bility” for the court to believe the conclusory assertion that LabCorp 
submitted false claims to the government.125 
The obvious counterargument to the majority’s opinion was pre-
sented in the dissent, which suggests that the majority’s interpreta-
tion of Rule 9(b) imposes an “impossible” burden, requiring more 
                                                                                                             
 120 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1315. 
 
 121 Id. at 1311 (“The False Claims Act does not create liability merely for a 
health care provider’s disregard of Government regulations or improper internal 
policies unless, as a result of such acts, the provider knowingly asks the Govern-
ment to pay amounts it does not owe.”) 
 122 Id. at 1311. 
 
 123 Id. at 1311 (“Rule 9(b)’s directive that “the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity” does not permit a False Claims 
Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in detail but then to allege simply 
and without any stated reason for his belief that claims requesting illegal payments 
must have been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted 
to the Government.”) 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1312. 
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than is necessary at the pleading stage.126  However, in an important 
footnote to the majority opinion, Judge Hull explains that this opin-
ion “merely lists some of the types of information that might have 
helped Clausen state an essential element of his claim with particu-
larity but does not mandate all of this information for any of the 
alleged claims.”127 So although the court suggested that amounts of 
charges, dates of billing, descriptions of billing policies, or a copy 
of a bill would be sufficient to survive a Rule 9(b) challenge, it did 
not hold that each are per se necessary.128 Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case for failure to 
comply with Rule 9(b) because Clausen failed to provide any infor-
mation other than his conclusory belief that the nature of the scheme 
implied claims must have been submitted.129 
Judge Barkett’s dissent argued that “conclusory” was the wrong 
word to describe the plaintiff’s complaint because Clausen listed 
dates of the allegedly improper medical service and claims that the 
government was billed a few days later, even providing the specific 
billing form.130 Barkett felt that this information was evidence that 
Clausen inherently had some insight into the billing practices of 
LabCorp, which is sufficient “indicia of reliability” to infer claims 
for payment were actually made.131 In addition, the dissent argued 
that practically, common sense dictates a reasonable expectation 
that a medical service provider would submit claims for payment 
                                                                                                             
 126 United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1315–
17 (11th Cir. 2002) (J. Barkett, dissenting). Judge Barkett approached the issue 
by focusing on the purpose of Rule 9(b), concluding that mere allegations that a 
false claim are submitted, like the ones asserted by Clausen, are enough to put 
defendants on notice and protect defendants from frivolous lawsuits. A district 
court in the D.C. Circuit has gone so far as to adopt Judge Barkett’s dissent in 
Clausen as the more appropriate interpretation. See U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes 
Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268-70 (D.D.C. 2002) (adopting 
the Clausen dissent and disagreeing with the majority for placing emphasis on 
“peculiarity” and not enough on the “purpose” of the rule.) 
 127 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 128 Id. at 1312. 
 129 Id. at 1315. 
 130 Id. at 1317. 
 131 Id. at 1317 n.3 (“Moreover, does not Clausen’s allegation that bills were 
submitted “on or within a few days” of the tests performed indicate that he had 
some familiarity with LabCorp’s billing practices?”) 
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after performing medical tests eligible for government reimburse-
ment.132 
In response, the majority called Clausen a “corporate outsider,” 
implying that the court could not assign reliability to his statements 
without more explanation (perhaps by elaborating on how he knew 
LabCorp would bill or describing the billing protocol for the com-
pany in general).133 Although recognizing the difficulty for corpo-
rate outsiders who file as qui tam relators to plead with specificity, 
the court refused to create a “special leniency” for Clausen to meet 
the pleading requirements.134 However, the court did mention its re-
fusal to relax the standard “under these particular circumstances,” 
showing its willingness to relax 9(b)’s requirement if a complaint 
alleged the right “indicia of reliability.”135 In fact, the court com-
mented in a footnote that an exception might be warranted where the 
relator alleges “prolonged multi-act schemes” where the fraud is 
more complex.136 This would serve to be important for the cases that 
followed Clausen. 
B.   Post-Clausen Interpretation of Rule 9(b) 
The first significant deviation from the standard announced in 
Clausen was in an unpublished opinion, Hill v. Morehouse Medical 
Associates, Inc.137 In Hill, the relator was a former employee of the 
defendant, a medical service provider.138 As a professional coder 
and biller for the company, Hill provided a detailed account of the 
fraudulent billing practices and scheme to defraud the govern-
ment.139 She provided details about who engaged in the schemes and 
when the schemes occurred, but could not provide exact dates or 
patient names that were submitted to the Government, as they were 
                                                                                                             
 132 Id. at 1317 (“Perhaps Clausen could have found some information indicat-
ing that LabCorp—whose business is to perform medical tests for payment—had 
a policy of billing for the tests it performed. But here, the majority simply asks 
for the obvious.”) 
 133 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1314. 
 134 Id. at 1314. 
 135 Id. at 1314. 
 136 Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1314 n.25 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 137 No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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confidential and in the possession of defendant.140 However, she did 
identify the billing forms and provide a first-hand account of exactly 
how the process worked.141 The court expanded on Clausen, inter-
preting footnote 25 to mean that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 
standard may be relaxed if “evidence of fraud [i]s uniquely held by 
the defendant provided that the complaint . . . set[s] forth a factual 
basis for such belief.”142 Thus, the court elaborated what constitutes 
an “indicia of reliability” to satisfy 9(b) and entitles a relator to a 
more relaxed pleading standard.143 
The court in Hill distinguished the facts of Clausen, where the 
relator was a “corporate outsider” and only offered conclusory alle-
gations to support his theory, which did not justify relaxing the 
heightened pleading requirements.144 Unlike the plaintiff in 
Clausen, Hill worked in the billing and coding department, the ac-
tual department from which the fraudulent billing schemes oc-
curred.145 This first-hand knowledge set her apart from the relator in 
Clausen and allowed her to support her legal theory by identifying 
confidential documents, providing facts about the billing process, 
the names of employees responsible for the fraud, and the frequency 
of the submissions for false payment.146 As such, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that Hill’s employment in the billing department and first-
hand knowledge of the fraudulent practice provided the necessary 
“indicia of reliability” for the court to infer that false claims were 
actually submitted and allow Hill to get past the pleading stage, de-
spite her lack of evidence proving as much.147 This decision, alt-
hough unpublished and lacking precedential value, is an example of 
how the Eleventh Circuit intended to consider relaxing the height-
ened pleading requirement in situations where the court could trust 
                                                                                                             
 140 Id at *2. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Hill v. Morehouse Med. Associates, Inc., 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, 
at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003). 
 144 Id. at *4. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at *5 (“Moreover, as Hill was an employee within the billing and coding 
department and witnessed firsthand the alleged fraudulent submissions, her fac-
tual allegations provide the indicia of reliability that is necessary in a complaint 
alleging a fraudulent billing scheme.”) 
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the relator’s less-than-sufficient allegations, which is not consistent 
with a per se rule that the Circuit is sometimes characterized as hav-
ing.148 
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the relationship between 
Clausen and Hill in later opinions. In Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit distinguished the facts from Hill to hold that a re-
lator employee salesperson did not provide the requisite “indicia or 
reliability” to satisfy Rule 9(b) when he failed to provide an under-
lying basis for his assertions.149 As a salesperson for defendant, 
Corsello was not a “corporate outsider,” but he was also not em-
ployed in the billing department and did not have access to files out-
side his department.150 The court narrowly interpreted Hill, holding 
that mere employment with a defendant does not automatically pro-
vide the “indicia of reliability” required by Clausen.151 The court 
acknowledged that the relator in Hill had also based some allega-
tions on “information and belief,” however noted that Hill provided 
a higher level of reliability due to her position in the company and 
her explanation for why she knew bills were submitted, which al-
lowed the court to accept her pleadings.152 Besides being generally 
“aware of billing practices,” Corsello could not specify why he be-
lieved false claims were submitted and so the Court held that “in-
sider” status was not by itself enough to satisfy Rule 9(b).153 
Taking a more nuanced approach, in United States ex rel Walker 
v. R&F Properties, the Eleventh Circuit held that the relator, a nurse 
practitioner employed by the defendant, met the heightened plead-
ing standard when she provided specific reasons for her belief that 
false claims had been submitted to the government, despite lacking 
documentary evidence.154 Even though the employee did not work 
in the billing department (like in Clausen), she did more than offer 
                                                                                                             
 148 One example is the Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanne-
ganti. 565 F.3d 180, 186, 190 & n. 32 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The Clausen court made 
plain its position that to plead a presentment claim, the minimum indicia of relia-
bility required to satisfy the particularity standard are the specific contents of ac-
tually submitted claims, such as billing numbers, dates, and amounts.”) 
 149 428 F.3d 1008, 1013–14 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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 154 433 F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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mere speculation that bills were sent to the government (like in Hill), 
such as describing conversations with other employees about the im-
proper billing practices (unlike in Corsello).155 
However, in U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, the court took a 
more “rigid” approach and reaffirmed that Clausen imposes a high 
standard, demanding some other indicia of reliability if a plaintiff 
can only plead mere conclusory allegations that bills were submit-
ted.156 Like in Clausen, the relator pleaded specifics about the fraud-
ulent scheme, citing patients, dates, and medical records for which 
false claims were submitted.157  However, Atkins failed to provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability to believe that false claims were ac-
tually submitted to the government.158 Unlike in Hill, he did not 
work in the billing department and, although he heard rumors about 
fraudulent billing practices, he never personally observed the fraud-
ulent behavior.159 Atkins could not provide reason for his belief that 
false claims were submitted and thus, the court dismissed his claim, 
“for it lack[ed] sufficient indicia of reliability to haul the defendants 
into court.”160 
In U.S. ex rel Sanchez v. Lymphatx, Inc, the Eleventh Circuit 
further retreated from the more relaxed approach taken in Walker, 
when it held that an office manager who had direct knowledge of 
her employer’s billing practice still failed to meet the requirements 
of Rule 9(b) because she did not provide any specific details about 
the actual false claims, such as “the dates on or the frequency with 
which the defendants submitted false claims, the amounts of those 
claims, or the patients whose treatment served as the basis for the 
claims.”161 The court held that “without these or similar details, 
Sanchez’s complaint lacks the ‘indicia of reliability’ necessary un-
der Rule 9(b) to support her conclusory allegations of wrongdo-
ing.”162 The court in Sanchez noted that Clausen and Walker might 
lead to inconsistent results, but ultimately upheld Clausen. “To the 
                                                                                                             
 155 Id. 
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extent that Walker conflicts with specificity requirements of 
Clausen,” the court wrote, “our prior-panel-precedent rule requires 
us to follow Clausen.”163 
Since Clausen and Hill were decided, several district courts in-
terpreted the Eleventh Circuit as having two separate requirements: 
either submit actual proof that false claims were submitted to the 
government or provide enough of an “indicia or reliability” for the 
court to relax the standard and infer that claims were likely submit-
ted.164 As Judge Huck in the Southern District of Florida explained, 
“While no specific claims were identified in Clausen, the identifica-
tion of specific claims is only one way to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s require-
ment, but it is not the only way . . . .As the Eleventh Circuit clarified 
in Hill, the identification of specific claims is not necessary where 
there is a reliable indication that claims were actually submitted.”165 
The Middle District of Georgia Court in U.S. ex rel. Willis v. 
Angels of Hope Hospice, Inc. noted yet another interpretation of 
Clausen that lacked clarity, asking “whether establishing the ‘indi-
cia of reliability’ is an additional standard a relator may use in lieu 
of pleading the details of the submission of false claims or if . . . it 
is a requirement in addition to pleading actual submission of at least 
a few false claims.”166 Ultimately, the district court held that it “does 
not read Clausen or its progeny to hold a relator must in every case 
allege detailed billing information to withstand a Rule 9(b) mo-
tion.”167 Thus, although the relator could not allege that false claims 
were actually presented, because of “the particular circumstances of 
this case,” (whereby the relator had recorded conversations of the 
                                                                                                             
 163 Id. at 1303 n. 4. 
 164 U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2012 WL 2871264 at *5 
(S.D. Fla. July 12, 2012) (interpreting Clausen to find that there is more than one 
way to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirements: either by identifying specific claims or 
providing “some indicia of reliability.”); See also U.S. ex rel. Brunson v. Narrows 
Health & Wellness, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1051-52 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (de-
termining that Hill contains legitimate precedential value, as it is not fundamen-
tally inconsistent with Clausen); U.S. ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 
529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340-41 (N.D. Fla. 2007) (holding complaint sufficient 
when the relator’s “personal participation put this complaint on a markedly higher 
level than any of the Eleventh Circuit cases in which a qui tam complaint was held 
deficient,” despite it lacking specific dates or amounts of deliveries). 
 165 Osheroff, 2012 WL 2871264 at *5. 
 166 No. 5:11-CV-041 MTT, 2014 WL 684657, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2014). 
 167 Id. at *8. 
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defendants’ management admitting to fraud), Clausen did not re-
quire dismissal.168 
In light of this inconsistency and uncertainty among the district 
courts, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified the holding and application 
of Clausen in its most recent opinions on this issue. The court in 
U.S. ex rel. Keeler v. Eisai, Inc. addressed circumstances when it 
should relax the 9(b) standard,169 and in U.S. ex rel. Mastej v. Health 
Management Associates, Inc., the court clarified the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s meaning of “other indicia of reliability.”170  In Keeler, the re-
lator argued that the court should apply a relaxed 9(b) standard and 
let him continue to discovery by arguing several exceptions that had 
been recognized by other courts: 1) his corporate insider status pro-
vided him with a sufficient indicia of reliability that excused his lack 
of particularity; 2) he had alleged a far reaching scheme that was so 
complex that general allegations were sufficient to establish a claim; 
and 3) the information needed to properly plead the claim were 
within the exclusive control of the defendant.171 Although the court 
recognized the validity of the reasoning behind Hill, where the Elev-
enth Circuit found appropriate circumstances to relax the require-
ment of Rule 9(b), it also noted that “Clausen supersedes Hill to the 
extent that Hill is inconsistent with Clausen.”172 And in this partic-
ular circumstance, a relaxed standard was not warranted because 
even the minimum pleading requirements of Clausen had not been 
met.173 
The court did not say that Hill was wrongly decided or that the 
Eleventh Circuit should never relax the pleading standard; instead, 
it clarified that the court would need to see more substantiated 
claims before it would do so.174 For example, in Hill, the relator pro-
vided first hand knowledge of the fraudulent billing practice.175 
                                                                                                             
 168 Id. (“No goal of Rule 9(b) would be served by requiring Willis to have 
recorded a clerk in Angels’ billing department confirming that a bill was actually 
submitted.”) 
 169 United States ex rel. Keeler v. Eisai, Inc., 568 F. App’x 783, 801 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 170 No. 13-11859, 2014 WL 5471925, at *12 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2014). 
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Here, the relator alleged he had “both personal and inside 
knowledge;” but in fact, he was a salesman without access to know 
whether providers actually submitted claims for reimbursement to 
the government.176 In Hill, the documents proving fraud were con-
fidential and could not be copied, whereas here, the documentation 
proving fraud could have been easily accessed.177 Ultimately, the 
court found that the complaint was based on unfounded allegations 
that could not be admitted without going against the entire purpose 
and intent of Rule 9(b).178 The result of Keeler is confirmation from 
the Eleventh Circuit that it would apply a more relaxed pleading re-
quirement if, like Hill, the facts of the case warranted it, while also 
reaffirming the validity of Clausen’s base requirements. 
In Mastej, the relator’s complaint detailed a financial incentive 
scheme run by the defendant and met Rule 9(b)’s required level of 
specificity.179 Mastej named the doctors and employees involved 
and described “what the incentives were, when they were provided, 
why they were provided, and why they were illegal.”180  However, 
he failed to provide the same level of detail in regard to whether 
actual false claims were submitted to the government.181 Instead of 
ending the analysis there, the Eleventh Circuit officially recognized 
that “detailed information about a representative claim is not the 
only way a relator can establish some indicia of reliability.”182 A 
relator could also show “that he personally was in a position to know 
that actual false claims were submitted to the government and had a 
factual basis for his alleged personal knowledge.”183 The court pro-
ceeded to analyze whether Mastej had proven this under a second 
step, whereby if the complaint lacked particularity as to false claims 
actually being submitted, the court would move on to discover 
whether any “indicia of reliability” warranted relaxing the stand-
ard.184 
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Ultimately, the court found that Mastej provided sufficient indi-
cations of reliability for the court to infer that actual claims were 
submitted to the government during his time as CEO of one of de-
fendant’s regional hospitals.185 The special considerations that pro-
vided “reliable indicia” during Mastej’s employment included his 
personal knowledge working for the defendant for six years; his fa-
miliarity with the company’s services, patients, revenues and billing 
practices; his personal interactions with the individuals who com-
mitted fraud; and his presence in meetings where Medicare patients 
and submissions to the government were discussed.186 However, 
“after his employment ended, Mastej was no longer privy to infor-
mation about the Defendants’ business practices, Medicare patients, 
referrals of patients, the billing of services to Medicare, or revenue 
from Medicare reimbursements.”187  Thus, while the court found 
Mastej’s allegations sufficient for the time period he worked for the 
Defendant, it also held that Mastej did not satisfy the requirement of 
9(b) for any allegations of fraud that occurred after Mastej left the 
Defendant’s employment.188  The court emphasized that this analy-
sis was on a case-by-case basis, and was not suggesting a qui tam 
plaintiff-employee could never base his or her case on false claims 
committed after one has left a defendant’s employment.189 But, be-
cause Mastej’s reliability stemmed from his highly influential role 
in the company, when he left, he could no longer provide a factual 
basis to support his allegation that the defendant must have submit-
ted claims to the government.190 
Additionally, the court considered the type of fraud being al-
leged, and in this case the fraud (an incentive for referral schemes) 
only required the names of the patients and alleged doctors who par-
ticipated in the referrals in order to prove the fraud.191 In this in-
stance, more specific evidence (such as the type of billing code, date 
of service and charge, or type of medial service) was not relevant to 
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whether fraud was committed against the government. 192 More im-
portantly than the result of the case, Mastej clarified that the Elev-
enth Circuit considers whether a relator can establish some other 
“indicia of reliability” besides providing billing details as an addi-
tional option to support an allegation that false claims were actually 
submitted to the government.193 
C.   Nuanced or Strict? 
After establishing the current precedent in Eleventh Circuit FCA 
cases, the question becomes what exactly is the Eleventh Circuit’s 
Rule 9(b) standard? The Solicitor General commented that the Elev-
enth Circuit has not consistently adhered to a rigid understanding of 
Rule 9(b) and cites Walker and Clausen as examples of the nuanced 
“indicia of reliability” approach.194 However, when considering the 
circuit split, most still assign the Eleventh Circuit to the strict side.195 
What is interesting is how the entire standard is in flux, whereby 
certain circuits seemingly go back and forth and others take a firm 
stance on one side.196 
Despite characterizations otherwise, the Eleventh Circuit’s ap-
proach is neither nuanced nor rigid. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has 
never wavered in setting its standard since the seminal case, 
Clausen.197 Indeed, Clausen always provided the option for other 
“indicia of reliability” to be offered as a means of supporting alle-
gations of fraud and the footnotes provide examples for when it may 
                                                                                                             
 192 Mastej, 2014 WL 5471925, at *13 (Compare to other FCA cases, where 
“the allegation is that a defendant’s Medicare claim contained a false statement 
because the claim sought reimbursement for particular medical services never ren-
dered to the patient, or for medical services that were unnecessary, overcharged, 
or miscoded, or for improper prescriptions, or for services not covered by Medi-
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on the details contained within the claim form—such as the type of medical ser-
vices rendered, the billing code or codes used on the claim form, and what amount 
was charged on the claim form for the medical services.”) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
 193 Id. at *11. 
 194 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 10–11. 
 195 Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher LLP, supra note 17. 
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 197 United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1312 
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be warranted to relax the heightened pleading standard.198 As Sec-
tion IIB suggests, from the very beginning, the Eleventh Circuit al-
lowed for both a strict and nuanced interpretation. This is why it is 
the correct approach. It properly balances the competing purposes 
behind Rule 9(b) and the False Claims Act in a way that polarizing 
strict or nuanced interpretations cannot. While we want to encourage 
lawsuits that expose fraud and reap the substantial reward, we also 
want to protect defendants from baseless lawsuits that could damage 
reputations or fail to provide adequate notice for a proper defense. 
The Eleventh Circuit takes this into account by requiring pleadings 
to show that false claims were actually presented to the government, 
because without particularity, “there is simply no actionable damage 
to the public fisc as required under the False Claims Act.” 199 
Although there is a valid argument that requiring less particular-
ity would still fulfill the purpose of Rule 9(b) in one context, such 
as when details of a scheme sufficiently put the defendant on notice 
as to the misconduct with which they are charged, it still does not 
protect defendants against “spurious charges of immoral and fraud-
ulent behavior.”200 While lack of information in a complaint does 
not necessitate that the lawsuit is frivolous, if 9(b) is to be safe-
guarded in even the slightest degree, there should be a threshold bar-
rier requiring specificity to show that false claims were submitted. 
At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges the intent 
behind the FCA, which some consider to be “the single most im-
portant tool that American taxpayers have to recover funds.”201 The 
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 200 United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1315–
17 (11th Cir. 2002) (J. Barkett, dissenting) (“While a requirement that the plaintiff 
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 201 Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Celebrates 25th 
Anniversary of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, JUSTICE.GOV (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-celebrates-25th-anni-
versary-false-claims-act-amendments-1986. 
1244 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
government strongly favors eliminating any barriers to entry for 
FCA lawsuits, and as such, the Solicitor General took the position 
that the “nuanced” approach is the correct interpretation because “a 
rigid rule that such complaints are inadequate would hinder the abil-
ity of qui tam relators to perform the role that Congress intended 
them to play in the detection and remediation of fraud against the 
United States.”202  However, the Solicitor General also made sure to 
distinguish between circuits that have a “per se” rigid rule, as op-
posed to those who do not consistently apply rigorous require-
ments.203 In doing so, he acknowledged that strict circuits are not 
necessarily incorrect when they also consider other factors to meet 
the requirement for particularity, such as how relators are often em-
ployees in the defendant’s company.204 
This further supports the argument that traditionally “strict” cir-
cuits that also allow inferences of reliability, like the Eleventh, take 
the more accurate approach. While those circuits require strict ad-
herence to Rule 9(b), they are also willing to relax the requirement 
when plaintiffs show indicators of reliability that reduce the risk for 
a frivolous or harmful lawsuit—in essence, meeting both the pur-
pose of Rule 9(b) and the FCA.205  If given another chance to con-
sider this issue, the government should take into consideration that 
the extremely “nuanced” approach is also incorrect because it dis-
                                                                                                             
 
 202 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 14–15. 
 
 203 See Id. at 13. 
 
 204 Id. at 15–16 (Additionally, the Solicitor General felt that “[s]ubjecting qui 
tam relators to a per se rule requiring the identification of specific false claims is 
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extremely nuanced standards pose more harm. Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae, supra note 90, at 10–11; Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 
F.3d at 156. 
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charges meaning from Rule 9(b) and provides less protection for un-
substantiated claims, despite its usefulness in helping the govern-
ment bring more actions under the FCA. 
Ultimately, more circuits should look to the Eleventh as a guide 
in order to properly utilize the False Claims Act, while also uphold-
ing the dignity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There should 
be neither a “nuanced” nor “strict” approach. Instead, the rule should 
be governed by a firm commitment to the rigid particularity require-
ment of 9(b) (which requires either representative samples or spe-
cific details that false claims were submitted), while also providing 
flexible support for plaintiffs with valid claims, but who may not 
have all the documents alleged with the highest detail. 
V.   WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI 
Given the important ramifications of this issue, many are calling 
for the Supreme Court to provide a definitive answer on how to ap-
ply the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) to actions under the 
FCA, and there is currently a pending petition before the Court.206  
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court will likely not need to 
grant certiorari on this issue for similar reasons that it denied the 
2014 petition from the Third Circuit.207 Many circuits seem to be 
shifting between ideologies, and others who are still on opposite 
ends of the spectrum will likely consider conforming to the majority 
as recoveries under the FCA continue to grow.208 
The First Circuit provides a clear example of a shifting ideology. 
It is commonly cited as taking the more nuanced approach, which 
generally requires “specific details of a fraudulent scheme paired 
with reliable indicia that can lead to a strong inference that claims 
                                                                                                             
 206 The petition arises from the D.C. Circuit case, United States ex rel. Heath 
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were submitted.”209  Yet, in a 2013 decision, United States ex rel. 
Ge v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., the First Circuit cited the Elev-
enth and Fourth Circuits to explain its pleading requirement.210 The 
court provided a non-exclusive list of details that should be alleged 
to identify false claims for payment, and although the standard did 
not constitute a “checklist of mandatory requirements,” the court felt 
that “at least some of the claims must be pleaded in order to satisfy 
Rule 9(b).”211 Although Ge could be interpreted as evidence that the 
First Circuit switched from a more nuanced to a stricter approach,212 
this Comment argues that it merely joined the Eleventh Circuit in 
finding an appropriate balance. The court even addressed as much, 
noting that although the False Claims Act creates financial incen-
tives for relators to expose fraud, it also attracts “parasitic relators;” 
thus, the First Circuit noted that Rule 9(b) is but one “of a number 
of limitations on qui tam actions.”213 
In contrast to circuits that seem to be moving from one ideology 
to another, the Third and Fourth Circuits are both examples of courts 
that have recently vocalized a firm stance that they identify as falling 
on one side of the circuit split.214  In Foglia v. Renal Ventures Man-
agement, LLC, the Third Circuit decided on the nuanced approach 
favored by the Solicitor General, who had recently said in an amicus 
curiae brief on this issue that the rigid approach is “unsupported by 
Rule 9(b) and undermines the FCA’s effectiveness as a tool to com-
bat fraud against the United States.”215  Ultimately, the Third Circuit 
sided with the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits to hold that in order to 
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satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), the relator must “provide par-
ticular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable 
indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually sub-
mitted.”216  The Third Circuit’s Rule 9(b) standard does not require 
much. In Foglia, the relator was a nurse who alleged the defendant 
was over-charging for unused drugs.217 Without seeking any further 
information other than inventory logs and the plaintiff’s theory of 
how the defendant might have engaged in fraudulent practices based 
on the amount of drugs used each day (and the court even acknowl-
edged that it was possible no fraud occurred), the court found that 
the plaintiff met the heightened pleading requirement because the 
allegations gave notice to the defendant and the billing records were 
within the control of the defendant.218  Despite the allegations 
providing sufficient notice to the defendants, this nuanced approach 
permits claims to proceed to discovery, despite real concern that no 
fraud had actually occurred—something that 9(b) avidly seeks to 
prevent.219 
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit adopted the rigid approach in 
United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North 
America, Inc., holding that “when a defendant’s actions, as alleged 
and as reasonably inferred from the allegations, could have led, but 
need not necessarily have led, to the submission of false claims, a 
relator must allege with particularity that specific false claims actu-
ally were presented to the government for payment.”220 The court 
intended to choose a side on the “circuit split,” explicitly saying “to 
the extent that other cases apply a more relaxed construction of Rule 
9(b) in such circumstances, we disagree with that approach.”221 
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However, because it took a “case-specific” focus, it may end up re-
solving cases in the balanced form the Eleventh Circuit does.222 In 
fact, by already distinguishing cases based on whether the inference 
leads towards a “necessary” versus “potential” submission of false 
claims, it intuitively would allow claims without specific details al-
leged to meet Rule 9(b)’s standard.223 For example, if the fraudulent 
scheme implies that the only other logical result of a defendant’s 
actions was to submit a claim to the government, the Fourth Circuit 
will infer it without requiring any particularized details proving false 
claims were submitted. This is the type of approach the Solicitor 
General seemed to support because it was a balanced opinion, in-
stead of an inflexible “per se” rule.224  This again demonstrates how 
the “rigid” approach assigned to the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits is 
not the incorrect interpretation, but instead the properly balanced 
one. 
Similarly, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits show signs of moving 
from a more strict approach to a more balanced approach.225  In 
United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of 
Utah, the Tenth Circuit cited and agreed with the First and Eleventh 
in holding that a relator must provide details that identify a false 
claim of payment made to the government.226 However, in United 
States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., the court cited 
the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits to hold that “claims under the 
FCA need only show the specifics of a fraudulent scheme and pro-
vide an adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false claims 
were submitted as part of that scheme.”227 Likewise, in a recent 
Eighth Circuit decision, United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland, the court found that in certain circum-
stances, it will adopt the lower pleading standard where a “relator 
can satisfy Rule 9(b) by alleging particular details of a scheme to 
                                                                                                             
 222 See Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 17. 
 
 225 United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 
472 F.3d 702, 727–28 (10th Cir. 2006); U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of 
Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 226 472 F.3d at 727–28. 
 227 614 F.3d at 1172. 
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submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong 
inference that claims were actually submitted.”228 
Although some circuits apply a “nuanced” approach, and others 
a “strict” one, the Eleventh Circuit’s standard is the one that bal-
ances both extremes. For example, the Eleventh Circuit requires par-
ticularized details for the alleged scheme to submit false claims, as 
well as particularized details that the false claims were actually sub-
mitted.229 However, if the relator cannot provide particularized de-
tails, he may nevertheless prove that reliable indicia exist to warrant 
relaxing the requirement.230 If the relator has a valid claim, then re-
gardless of whether or not he is able to prove that a defendant sub-
mitted bills to the government, the relator’s case will not be dis-
missed as long as he provides the court with other reasons to trust 
his allegations.231 
Proponents of the nuanced approach might argue that the “bal-
anced” approach is nothing more than the strict circuits adopting the 
“nuanced” approach. However, there is a fine distinction between 
the two approaches. The balanced circuits do not automatically as-
sert that mere allegations of a scheme allow the court to infer fraud-
ulent claims were submitted for payment, whereas that approach is 
the “nuanced” circuit’s default rule.  That approach is inappropriate 
for the reasons provided in the above sections—it degrades the 
meaning of Rule 9(b) in order to assist the purposes of the FCA. In 
contrast, the balanced circuits require that both the fraudulent 
scheme and false submissions for payment be pleaded with speci-
ficity. It is only after attempting to ascertain this strict requirement 
that these courts will then proceed to the next step—determining 
whether a sufficient indicia of reliability has been demonstrated to 
allow a reasonable inference false claims were submitted. This two-
step process is not an inflexible per se rule.  Instead, it is the proper 
application of Rule 9(b), which tries to work with the intent of Con-
gress and find reason to believe a FCA relator by finding legitimacy 
in their pleading. Thus, while the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is 
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similar to both the strict and nuanced interpretations, it correctly in-
corporates both into a two-step analysis that appropriately balances 
the purposes of Rule 9(b) in the FCA context. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will not need to grant certiorari 
if circuits continue the trend of shifting from a more extreme ap-
proach (whether strict or nuanced) to a more balanced one. How-
ever, if the Court does decide to intervene in order to provide clear 
direction, this Comment strongly urges it to utilize the Eleventh Cir-
cuit as a model FCA pleading standard. Circuits that are too nuanced 
are hamstringing the purpose of Rule 9(b), while circuits that are too 
strict are impeding the effectiveness of the False Claims Act. The 
Eleventh Circuit, while still demanding much more specificity than 
nuanced standards, strikes the perfect balance between servicing 
both demands. 
CONCLUSION 
Pleading cases under the False Claims Act presents many inter-
esting dilemmas. There are multiple moving parts, actors, and com-
peting interests on both sides. Does the court want to honor the pur-
pose of Rule 9(b), but make it more difficult to plead a claim? Or 
does it want to honor Congress’s intent behind passing the False 
Claims Act by letting as many relators have their day in court as 
possible, no matter the legitimacy of their pleadings? Plaintiffs are 
incentivized to file FCA lawsuits in order to reap a substantial re-
ward and may file frivolous claims simply because there is a slight 
chance that they succeed and realize the benefits. On the other hand, 
defendants want to get the case thrown out as early as possible and 
so automatically file 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, alleging failure to 
adequately plead with particularity under Rule 9(b)—even if they 
actually defrauded the government. Do government contractors and 
heavily regulated industries, like the healthcare industry, use this lit-
igation to better hide their fraudulent activities? Or is the False 
Claims Act working and forcing corporations to comply more 
strictly with government regulations?232  With the potential for a qui 
                                                                                                             
 232 The DOJ has also placed a “renewed emphasis” on encouraging govern-
ment compliance, in addition to monetary recovery, evident by the growing 
amount of settlement agreements. At the American Bar Association’s 10th Na-
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tam relator to win millions and the government regaining billions, 
all of this becomes a high stakes game that puts the controversy over 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements on the radar for so many of 
these actors. For these reasons, it is extremely important that there 
be standardization on this issue. Hopefully, the reasoning behind 
this Comment will challenge the notion that the nuanced approach 
is the correct interpretation, and instead encourage more circuits to 
adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s well-balanced False Claims Act plead-
ing standard. 
                                                                                                             
tional Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement, the As-
sistant Attorney General Stuart Delery told attendees that using the FCA to en-
courage “best practices” was a government priority. Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher 
LLP, supra note 17. 
